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Abstract
To explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental as-
set market model of Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988), we vary the
fundamental value process (constant or declining) and the cash-to-asset
value-ratio (constant or increasing). We observe high mispricing in treat-
ments with a declining fundamental value, while overvaluation emerges
when coupled with an increasing C/A-ratio. A questionnaire reveals that
the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects, as they expect
the fundamental value to stay constant. Running the experiment with a
diﬀerent context (“stocks of a depletable gold mine” instead of “stocks”)
signiﬁcantly reduces mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion.
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1We explore possible causes for the emergence of “bubbles” in experimental
asset markets replicating the seminal design introduced by Vernon L. Smith,
Gerry L. Suchanek & Arlington W. Williams (1988, henceforth SSW). In par-
ticular, we separate the eﬀect of a declining/constant fundamental value (FV)
from the eﬀect of an increasing/constant cash-to-asset-value-ratio (C/A-ratio).1
We observe that confusion in treatments with declining fundamental value is
the main driver for mispricing and leads to overvaluation when coupled with a
high C/A-ratio.2 This is supported by ﬁndings from a questionnaire and from
two control treatments where the notion “stocks” is replaced by “stocks of a de-
pletable gold mine”. This change in context reduces subjects’ confusion about
the FV (elicited by a questionnaire) and leads to signiﬁcantly smaller mispricing
and overvaluation. The design is robust to treatment changes like a higher vari-
ance of the dividend process and a higher initial C/A-ratio that have rekindled
bubbles in earlier experiments.
In 1988, Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988) introduced a new and ground-
breaking methodology to test the eﬃcient market hypothesis (EMH) postulated
by Eugene F. Fama (1970). While empirical studies testing the EMH suﬀer
from the FV being unobservable, fundamentals become perfectly observable in
laboratory asset markets. SSW deﬁne the FV as the expected value of a ﬁnite
stream of stochastic dividend payments generating a FV that declines determin-
istically. The key ﬁnding of SSW is that market prices deviate strongly from
the FV, with prices being mostly too high – the authors talk of bubbles. Over
the past two decades numerous studies have replicated and modiﬁed this set-
ting, exploring how parameter changes, such as short selling, experience, futures
markets, constant fundamental value, etc. inﬂuence bubble formation.3
When investigating the properties of SSW-markets in more detail, one ob-
serves that the amount of cash grows due to dividend payments, while the FV of
the asset declines to zero. Thus, the C/A-ratio in the market increases several
fold over the course of the experiment.4 Hence, SSW-markets are characterized
by a declining FV combined with an increasing C/A-ratio over time.5
1The C/A-ratio is the ratio of all subjects’ cash holdings and the total asset value, i.e.
number of shares outstanding multiplied by FV.
2Overvaluation is present when average prices are above the respective fundamental value
(FV). Mispricing measures deviations of prices from FVs, irrespective whether they are pos-
itive or negative. Here we follow Thomas St¨ ockl, J¨ urgen Huber & Michael Kirchler (2010)
and measure mispricing by Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD) and overvaluation by Relative
Deviation (RD).
3Ernan Haruvy & Charles N. Noussair (2006) investigate the impact of short-selling and
buying on margin. Mark Van Boening, Arlington W. Williams & Shawn LaMaster (1993)
use call markets instead of continuous double auction markets, while Vivian Lei, Charles N.
Noussair & Charles R. Plott (2001) add a parallel market with a short-term asset that ex-
ists only for one period. Vernon Smith, Mark van Boening & Charissa P. Wellford (2000),
Charles N. Noussair, Stephane Robin & Bernard Ruﬃeux (2001), and J¨ org Oechssler, Carsten
Schmidt & Wendelin Schnedler (2007) keep the FV constant over time. Lei, Noussair & Plott
(2001) preclude speculation by prohibiting buyers to resell the asset and sellers to buy it. In
most of the aforementioned studies, bubbles still emerge. Instead, bubbles are less pronounced
with experienced subjects trading in the same setting, and when special emphasis is put on
a thorough understanding of the dividend process. This is reported in Martin Dufwenberg,
Tobias Lindqvist & Evan Moore (2005) and Vivian Lei & Filip Vesely (2009), respectively.
4In most settings the C/A-ratio increases by a factor of 15 to 50.
5Although unexplainable from a rational expectations perspective, Gunduz Caginalp,
David Porter & Vernon Smith (1998), Gunduz Caginalp, David Porter & Vernon Smith (2001),
and Haruvy & Noussair (2006) report that high initial C/A-ratios drive bubble formation in
experimental asset markets. Given these behavioral ﬁndings and the dramatic increase in the
2We separate the eﬀect of a declining/constant FV from the eﬀect of an
increasing/constant C/A-ratio to provide explanations for the impact of each
variable on mispricing and overvaluation. With a 2x2 design we test for each
factor’s impact, as, in addition to the replication of experiments with a declining
FV and an increasing C/A-ratio and experiments with a constant FV and a
constant C/A-ratio, we introduce one treatment with a declining FV and a
constant C/A-ratio and one treatment with a constant FV and an increasing
C/A-ratio. Table 1 provides an overview of the 2x2 design and related papers.
Table 1: Overview over the two treatment variables “C/A-ratio” and “Funda-
mental value” (FV) and related literature. For two of the four quadrants no




increasing literature availablea no literature
constant no literature literature availableb
a See e.g. Gunduz Caginalp, David Porter & Vernon Smith (2000);
Caginalp, Porter & Smith (2001); Dufwenberg, Lindqvist & Moore
(2005); Haruvy & Noussair (2006); Ernan Haruvy, Yaron Lahav
& Charles Noussair (2007); Reshmaan N. Hussam, David Porter
& Vernon L. Smith (2008); Charles N. Noussair & Steven Tucker
(2006); Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988); Smith, van Boening
& Wellford (2000), A2; Matthias Sutter, J¨ urgen Huber & Michael
Kirchler (2010).
b See e.g. Caginalp, Porter & Smith (1998); Noussair, Robin &
Ruﬃeux (2001); Oechssler, Schmidt & Schnedler (2007); Smith, van
Boening & Wellford (2000), A1.
We observe (i) high mispricing in treatments with declining FVs and (ii)
overvaluation when a declining FV is coupled with an increasing C/A-ratio.
A questionnaire reveals that (iii) the concept of a declining fundamental value
generates confusion among subjects, with most subjects believing the FV to
either stay constant or increase. (iv) In two control treatments with the context
“stocks of a depletable gold mine” we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly smaller mispricing and
overvaluation than in the comparable treatment using the term “stocks”. This
holds even when the variance of the dividend process and the initial C/A-ratio
are increased several fold. This points to the importance confusion about the
FV plays in bubble formation.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 outlines the research questions
and methodology, Section 2 provides details on market design, experimental
treatments, and experimental implementation. Section 3 presents results from
the experiments and Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
C/A-ratio over time in markets with declining FVs the C/A-ratio was chosen as one of the
two treatment variables in this study.
31 Research Questions and Methodology
1.1 Research Questions
Exploring possible causes of bubbles Smith, van Boening & Wellford (2000)
investigate the impact of dividend timing on asset prices. In their Treatment
A1 the asset pays a random dividend at the end of the experiment, while in
A2 dividends are paid out each period. The former model leads to a constant
FV with a constant C/A-ratio while the latter is the classic SSW-design with a
declining FV and an increasing C/A-ratio. The authors conclude that frequent
dividend payments in Treatment A2 induce bubble formation in comparison to
A1 where no bubbles occur. These ﬁndings serve as starting point for Noussair,
Robin & Ruﬃeux (2001) who conjecture that (i) frequent dividend payments
increase the likelihood of bubbles and that (ii) changing (declining) FVs con-
tribute to bubble formation, as prices need to adjust to the FV each period.
They combine per period dividend payments (with an expected value of zero)
with a constant FV (the asset is bought back at the end of the experiment at an
ex-ante known terminal value). Reporting moderate bubbles, they argue that
a constant FV cannot eliminate bubbles completely. Again, the authors name
frequent dividend payments as the main driver of bubble formation.
However, comparing treatments A2 to A1 in Smith, van Boening & Well-
ford (2000), and the studies of Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988) to Noussair,
Robin & Ruﬃeux (2001) is problematic, since two parameters are changed si-
multaneously: The FV is constant, rather than declining and the C/A-ratio
changes from increasing to constant. Consequently, it is impossible to exactly
identify whether the larger bubbles in Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988) and
in A2 of Smith, van Boening & Wellford (2000) are due to a declining FV,
an increasing C/A-ratio, or both. With a 2x2 design we examine changes in
each factor (FV-process and C/A-ratio) separately. We formulate the following
research questions:
 RQ1: Does an increasing C/A-ratio lead to mispricing and/or overvalua-
tion?
 RQ2: Does a declining fundamental value lead to mispricing and/or over-
valuation?
If the increasing C/A-ratio proved to be the main driver of mispricing and/or
overvaluation, the results of Smith, van Boening & Wellford (2000) would be
supported.
However, if the declining FV turned out to be the main driver, we focus
on behavioral explanations, especially the inﬂuence of the experiment’s context
and potential confusion of experimental subjects. Two recent papers, Eileen
Chou, Margaret McConnell, Rosemarie Nagel & Charles R. Plott (2009) and
Vernon L. Smith (2010), stress the importance of context (the former talk of
“recognition”) in laboratory experiments. The latter argues that subjects inter-
pret the task they face in an experiment against the background of their past
experiences and personal knowledge. Summarizing his experiences with markets
of the SSW-type, Smith outlines that subjects seem to be “confused”, and that
they “do not get the message” (p. 6 and 7, respectively, in Smith 2010). Follow-
ing a similar line of reasoning, J¨ org Oechssler (2010) argues that the SSW-design
4is very diﬀerent from real markets and may therefore be diﬃcult to understand
for subjects. Consequently, we conjecture that the term “stock” used in the
instructions confuses subjects as it is commonly associated with stable or up-
ward trending prices (Smith 2010, p. 6, talks of a “homegrown expectation of
prices rising”), in contrast to the deterministically declining FV-paths in the
experiment.6
 RQ3: If a declining fundamental value signiﬁcantly contributes to mis-
pricing and/or overvaluation, is confusion, i.e. the lack of understanding
the FV-concept, evident?
To test this research question, we run a questionnaire after each experiment on
the understanding of the FV process and we conduct two control treatments
where we change one paragraph in the instructions, talking of “stocks of a
depletable gold mine” rather than “stocks” in general.
1.2 Measuring Mispricing and Overvaluation
St¨ ockl, Huber & Kirchler (2010) point out some weaknesses of previously used
bubble measures. Following them, we apply one measure for “mispricing” and
one for “overvaluation”.
Table 2: Bubble measures: RAD (relative absolute deviation) and RD (relative
deviation).
Measure calculation




   Pp   FVp
   =jFV j
Relative deviation RD = 1
N
∑N
p=1 (Pp   FVp)=jFV j
Notes: Pp = (volume-weighted) mean price in period p; FVp =
fundamental value in period p; FV = average fundamental value
of the market.
Table 2 outlines details on the two measures we apply: RAD (relative ab-
solute deviation) for mispricing and RD (relative deviation) for overvaluation.
The resulting numbers of RAD and RD are easy to interpret – a RAD of 0.1
means that prices on average diﬀer by 10 percent from the average fundamental
value. RD provides additional information whether the asset is overvalued –
e.g., with a RD of 0.1 (–0.1) prices are on average 10 percent higher (lower)
than the average fundamental value. A combination of RAD=0.1 and RD=0
indicates that prices are on average 10 percent oﬀ the fundamental value, but
phases of over- and undervaluation cancel out. In this case, mispricing would
be present, but non-systematic as far as its direction is concerned.7
6Literature already provides hints that subjects may have diﬃculties in understanding
the concept of a declining FV in the SSW-design: Lei & Vesely (2009) put special emphasis
on the protocol of the experiment and report that no bubbles emerge when they introduce
a pre-market phase to focus subjects’ attention on the dividend structure. The results in
Dufwenberg, Lindqvist & Moore (2005) can be interpreted in a similar way, since experience in
repeated SSW-markets with identical settings, and thus a better understanding of the process
governing the FV, eliminates bubbles. Note however, that experience only reduces bubbles
when the setting remains unchanged. Hussam, Porter & Smith (2008) provide evidence that
even among experienced subjects bubbles can be rekindled when the initial C/A-ratio and the
variance of the dividend process are increased several fold.
7We additionally include results of some of the more familiar measures used in earlier
52 The Experiment
In each of our laboratory markets, ten subjects trade a dividend paying stock
for experimental currency (Taler) in a sequence of ten periods. Dividends are
paid out at the end of each period or are deferred and paid out at the end of
the experiment. The realized dividend payments are not known in advance, but
at the end of each period subjects learn the dividend of the respective period.
To determine the asset’s FV, subjects know the possible dividend realiza-
tions, their probability of occurrence, the total number of trading periods, and
the terminal value of the asset (if any).
FVk = E(dividend)  remaining periods + terminal value: (1)
Given this information set, the FV in period k is the product of the expected
dividend payment per period and the number of periods remaining plus any
terminal value (zero in SSW). This is public knowledge (see experimental in-
structions in Appendices D, E, and F).
2.1 Markets with a Declining Fundamental Value
In markets with a declining FV, the dividend is either 0 or 10 with equal proba-
bility. The FV in period 1 is therefore 50 and decreases by 5 Taler each period.
After ten periods the asset expires worthless, no terminal value is paid to sub-
jects.
2.2 Markets with a Constant Fundamental Value
In markets with a constant FV the dividend per period is either –5 or 5 with
equal probability. Thus, dividends have an expected value of zero. In these
treatments assets have a positive terminal value of 50. Hence, the FV is constant
across periods with a value of 50.
2.3 Experimental Treatments
At the beginning of each experimental session half of the subjects is endowed
with 60 shares and 1,000 Taler, while the other half is endowed with 20 shares
and 3,000 Taler. Valued at the initial FV of 50, which is identical in all treat-
ments, each subject starts with an initial wealth of 4,000 Taler. At the beginning
of each market the total cash amount in the market (51,000 + 53,000 = 20,000
Taler) equals the value of all stocks in the market (520 + 560 = 400 stocks 
50 Taler = 20,000 Taler). Thus, the initial ratio between cash and asset value
(the C/A-ratio) is 1.8
We implement a 2x2 design with the treatment variables FV (either constant
or declining) and C/A-ratio (either constant or increasing). Table 3 presents an
overview of the diﬀerent treatment abbreviations and properties. The treatment
abbreviations are to be read as follows: The symbols “” and “—” specify
studies on the SSW-model, like share turnover (ST), price amplitude (PA), total dispersion
(TD), and average bias (AB) in Table A2 of the Appendix. See Table A1 for details on the
formulae.
8Diﬀerent values are used in round 2 of Treatment T6(+G re).
6whether the FV is declining or constant. “=” and “+” indicate whether the
C/A-ratio is constant or increasing.9
Table 3: Treatment parameterization
T1(+)a T2(|+) T3( =) T4(— =) T6(+G re), R2
Exp. dividend 5 0 5 0 6
Periods 10 10 10 10 10
FV0 50 50 50 50 60
FV10 0 50 0 50 0
# Stocks 400 400 400 400 200
Total asset value0 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 12,000
Initial cash 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 40,000
Cash in/outﬂow 2,000 + -2,000 0 1,200
Dividend account no yes yes yes no
Source of in/outﬂow dividend exogenous saving no cash dividend
cash inﬂow account inﬂow
FV process  —  — 
C/A-ratio + (1-19) + (1-19) = (1) = (1) + (3.33-42.33)
a The parametrization is identical in T5(+G) and in round 1 (R1) of T6(+G re).
The ﬁrst treatment, T1(+), replicates the classic experiment of the SSW–
type with declining FV and increasing C/A-ratio. Dividend payments generate
frequent inﬂows of cash into the market, which increases the available cash
in the market on average by 2,000 (either 0 or 4,000 with equal probability) in
each period.10 Over the course of the experiment the “monetary basis” therefore
doubles. This increase in cash is accompanied by a declining fundamental value,
which falls by 90 percent from period 1 to the start of period 10. Thus, the
C/A-ratio increases nineteenfold over the course of the experiment.11
Treatment two, T2(—+), is designed with a constant FV and an identical
increase in the C/A-ratio as in T1(+). Subjects receive increasing exogenous
cash inﬂows in each period which mimic the development of the C/A-ratio in
T1(+). This requires quite substantial cash inﬂows in each period – e.g. the
cash inﬂow into the market is 200,000 in the last period. Dividends are collected
in a separate dividend account.
In the third treatment, T3( =), characterized by a declining FV and a
constant C/A-ratio, dividend payments are displayed, but collected in a separate
account and paid out at the end of the experiment. However, this would still
lead to a tenfold increase in the C/A-ratio until period 10, as the FV falls by 90
percent. Consequently, we additionally reduce the monetary basis by deducting
200 Taler from each subject’s cash account at the end of each period. If a subject
has less than 200 Taler, her money holdings become negative and she is not
9Table A4 in Appendix C provides further details on each treatment.
10In SSW-markets dividend yields are extremely high, starting at 10 percent in the ﬁrst
period of a 10-period setting and reaching 33, 50, and 100 percent, respectively, in the last
three periods. In real markets, however, dividend yields are very low – the dividend yield
of stocks on the NYSE is currently around 2 percent, and even lower at 0.49 percent on
NASDAQ, where 73 of the top-100 companies did not pay any dividend in 2007. Only one
third of companies listed on NYSE pay dividends. Source: http://www.indexarb.com.
11Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988) use diﬀerent parameters. E.g. in their treatment
“Design 1” (9 traders, 30 periods) they implement a C/A-ratio in period 1 of 1.2 which
increases to 48.9 in period 30.
7allowed to buy assets or post bids until her money holdings are positive again.
Therefore, the C/A-ratio of 1 remains constant over time, as the “monetary
basis” in the market is reduced by 90 percent from period 1 to period 10 as
well.
Treatment four, T4(— =), features a constant FV and a constant C/A-ratio.
Dividends are collected in a separate dividend account.
Treatment ﬁve, T5(+G), is an exact replication of T1(+). We only
change one paragraph in the instructions, talking of “stocks of a depletable gold
mine” rather than “stocks.”
Treatment six, T6(+G re), serves as a robustness check for T5(+G) and
is inspired by Hussam, Porter & Smith (2008) who rekindled bubbles with twice-
experienced subjects by increasing the C/A-ratio and the variance of the divi-
dend process. The treatment consists of two rounds (R1 and R2) of ten periods
each. The ﬁrst round is an exact replication of Treatment T5(+G). In the
second round the number of stocks is reduced, while both, cash holdings and
the variance of the dividend process are increased.12
2.4 Market Architecture
Subjects trade in a continuous double auction with open order books with all
orders executed according to price and then time priority. Market orders have
priority over limit orders and are always executed instantaneously. Any order
size and the partial execution of limit orders are possible. Shorting stocks and
borrowing money is not allowed.
The trading screen provides subjects with current information on their stock
and Taler holdings. All transaction prices with the corresponding trading time
are shown in a real time chart on the left side of the screen.13 Each market
consists of 10 trading periods of 120 seconds each. Taler and stock holdings are
carried over from one period to the next. No interest is paid on Taler holdings
and there are no transaction costs.
2.5 Experimental Implementation
Six markets were run for each of the six treatments. All 36 experimental mar-
kets were conducted between December 2009 and October 2010 at the University
of XY with a total of 360 students (bachelor and master students in business
administration and economics). Most subjects already took part in other ex-
periments in economics but each subject participated in only one market of this
study. We especially took care that the subjects did not participate in earlier as-
set market experiments of comparable design. The markets were programmed
and conducted with z-Tree 3.2.8. by Urs Fischbacher (2007). Subjects were
recruited using ORSEE by Ben Greiner (2004).
At the beginning of each session subjects had 15 minutes to read the instruc-
tions on their own. This was done to eliminate any possible experimenter bias.
We set up the instructions in an identical way to the papers of Dufwenberg,
Lindqvist & Moore (2005) for markets with declining FVs, and Noussair, Robin
& Ruﬃeux (2001) for markets with constant FVs to ensure comparability to
12Details on the parameters follow in Section 3.3.3.
13See Appendix D for a screenshot.
8existing literature. Afterwards, the trading screen was explained in detail, fol-
lowed by two trial periods to allow subjects to become familiar with the trading
screen. After the main experiment, subjects had to complete a questionnaire
testing their understanding of the FV-process and asking for demographic data.
In markets with a declining FV the traded asset is worthless after the last
period. Thus, only Taler holdings are converted at a known exchange rate of 400
Taler = 1 Euro (The exchange rate is 520 in T6(+G re), R2). In markets with
a constant fundamental value, the ﬁnal wealth (units of the asset multiplied by
FV of 50 plus Taler holdings) is converted at an exchange rate of 400 (4000)
Taler = 1 Euro in T4(— =) (T2(—+)).
Each session lasted around 60 to 80 minutes and average earnings for treat-
ments T1(+) to T5(+G) were 10 Euro while average earnings in Treatment
T6(+G re) were 20 Euro. Before the main experiment we ran a standard lot-
tery experiment to measure risk-aversion similar to Charles A. Holt & Susan K.




Figure 1 provides an overview of average prices (bold lines with circles), price
paths of individual markets (grey lines), and the FVs (bold lines) in treatments
T1(+) to T4(— =). One can see that treatments with declining FVs are
characterized by a high variability of price paths in individual markets. On
aggregate, average prices are well above the FV in T1(+) while average prices
track the fundamental value well in T3( =). In treatments with constant FVs,
average prices track fundamentals quiet accurately.
Turning to mispricing (RAD) and overvaluation (RD) one can see patterns
in Table 4. In T1(+), in which the fundamental value declines and the C/A-
ratio increases (top left panel of Figure 1), a RAD of 41.4 percent documents
high mispricing and a RD of 29.7 percent marks strong overvaluation. This is
in line with earlier literature on the SSW-design. Mispricing still remains high,
but overvaluation is no longer present (on average) as soon as the C/A-ratio is
kept constant over time in markets with declining fundamental value (bottom
left panel of Figure 1, Treatment T3( =)). Due to the constant C/A-ratio
of 1 in T3( =), individuals lack the buying power to bid prices up or keep
them high when others want to sell. Prices decline along with overall money
supply, but confusion about the declining FV-process is still evident in the huge
dispersion of prices (measured by RAD).
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Figure 1: Fundamental value (FV, bold line), average treatment prices (bold
line with circles) and volume-weighted mean prices of individual markets (grey
lines) as a function of period. Left panels: treatments T1(+) and T3( =)
featuring declining FVs. Right panels: treatments T2(—+) and T4(— =) with
constant FVs.
In contrast, both treatments with constant FVs (right panels in Figure 1)
display very eﬃcient prices.
3.2 Statistical Tests on Research Questions 1 and 2
To test for diﬀerences between treatments we conduct Mann-Whitney-U-tests.
We consider markets with an increasing C/A-ratio (declining FV) and test them
against markets with a constant C/A-ratio (constant FV) to answer RQ1 (RQ2).
We run this analysis for the pooled data set and for pairwise comparison of
treatments. Table 5 provides an overview of the pairwise treatment comparisons
to answer the two research questions.
The results are presented in Table 6. It is evident that on aggregate markets
with declining fundamental values are characterized by strong mispricing com-
pared to markets with constant FVs as the Z-value of RAD is highly signiﬁcant
with a diﬀerence in means of 30.7 percentage points (see line 1 in the bottom
14Additionally, we provide, for each market, values of RAD and RD and values of some
previously used bubble measures ST, PA, TD, AB in Table A2 in Appendix A.
15To test whether results are driven by outliers we run a robustness check by excluding the
markets with the highest RAD in each treatment from the analysis. Results do not change
(see Table A3 in the Appendix).
10Table 5: Overview of the pairwise Mann-Whitney-U-Tests to answer RQ1 and
RQ2.
T1(+) T4(— =)
T2(—+) RQ2 (FV) RQ1 (C/A)
T3( =) RQ1 (C/A) RQ2 (FV)
Table 6: Tests on the research questions. The values represent the diﬀerences
in means (∆ mean) of the treatments under investigation and Z-values from a
Mann-Whitney-U-Test (Z).15
RQ1 (C/A-ratio) RAD RD
T1(+) & T2(—+) vs T3( =) & T4(— =) ∆ mean 0:080 0:152
N=24 Z  0:751  2:078
T1(+) vs T3( =) ∆ mean 0:109 0:337
N=12 Z  0:801  1:601
T2(—+) vs T4(— =) ∆ mean 0:052  0:033
N=12 Z  0:641  1:121
RQ2 (FV) RAD RD
T1(+) & T3( =) vs T2(—+) & T4(— =) ∆ mean 0:307 0:171
N=24 Z  3:753  1:963
T1(+) vs T2(—+) ∆ mean 0:335 0:357
N=12 Z  2:402  2:882
T3( =) vs T4(— =) ∆ mean 0:278  0:014
N=12 Z  2:882  0:160
Notes: * and ** represent the 5 percent and 1 percent signiﬁcance levels.
panel of Table 6). While the results for overvaluation look similar on the ag-
gregate level (with a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of 17.1 percentage points), a closer
inspection of Table 6 reveals that overvaluation is very strong in T1(+) com-
pared to T2(—+) and T3( =). Though not signiﬁcant due to the small sam-
ple size and the high variance in individual market realizations when comparing
T1(+) with T3( =), an increasing C/A-ratio in markets with declining FVs
seems to be necessary to lead to overvaluation as well.16
Summarizing our results so far, we ﬁnd high mispricing in treatments with
declining FV, while overvaluation only emerges when a declining FV is coupled
16Risk-averse subjects might act more cautiously in treatments with potentially negative
dividend payments (those with a constant FV) compared to treatments with strictly non-
negative dividends (those with a declining FV). This would result in less speculation and
consequently in lower turnover. Therefore, we run the Mann-Whitney-U-Tests of Table 6
with share turnover (ST) as well as the variable of interest. We ﬁnd no statistical diﬀerence
in all speciﬁcations, i.e. trading volume is comparable across all treatments. We thank an
anonymous referee for pointing us to this idea. See Table A3 in the Appendix for a related
analysis.
11with an increasing C/A-ratio. This is not in line with Smith, van Boening &
Wellford (2000), as frequent dividend payments in treatments with ﬂat FV do
not lead to bubbles.
3.3 Research Question 3.: Behavioral Reasons for the Im-
pact of the FV-Process
In a recent paper Vernon Smith states that subjects may be “confused” and
“do not get the message” in SSW-type markets (Smith 2010, p. 6 and 7, re-
spectively). Furthermore, Smith highlights the importance of the context an
experiment is presented in. This might be an important factor here: the term
“stock” in the instructions may call to subjects’ minds associations of stable or
upward trending FV-paths – this is supported by the fact that even professional
traders produce similar price patterns compared to other subject pools: their
daily experience is for stock prices to not fall deterministically and this pattern
is called to their mind when they read “stocks” in the instructions (see Oechssler
(2010) for a similar line of reasoning and Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988)
for experimental results with professional traders).
To test the impact of context and of subjects’ confusion, we run a question-
naire and two control treatments with diﬀerent context.
3.3.1 Questionnaire
After each experimental session, we ask the following question: “The fundamen-
tal value in period p is 50. What will the fundamental value most likely be in
the next period?” Subjects were asked to choose among values of 40, 45, 50, 55
or 60.17
The right panel of Figure 2 provides the distribution of subjects’ deviations
from the correct forecast in both treatments with constant FVs. Nearly 70 per-
cent estimate the FV correctly and the remaining 30 percent are symmetrically
distributed around the correct estimation.
In contrast, in markets with declining FVs (left panel in Figure 2), around
57 percent of subjects expect the FV to remain constant or increase and less
than 30 percent of all subjects forecast the FV correctly.18
Subjects obviously are confused by the concept of a declining FV, even after
having traded in the market for 10 periods. As most subjects in SSW-style
markets believe that the FV will stay constant, prices do not fall, producing a
“bubble” as the FV declines. This holds especially when an increasing C/A-ratio
provides enough liquidity to the market.
3.3.2 Control Treatment with Context “Gold Mine”
If subjects’ confusion about the FV-process is the driver behind bubble forma-
tion in SSW-markets, a more intuitive context in the instructions should reduce
confusion and abate bubbles. Our control treatment T5(+G) is an exact repli-
cation of T1(+), i.e. the classic SSW-setting, but with a diﬀerent context used
17The questionnaire was not incentivized.
18The deviations from the correct forecast of the FV are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between
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Figure 2: Errors in forecasting the FV in the questionnaire. Left panel: treat-
ments T1(+) and T3( =) with declining FV. Right panel: treatments
T2(—+) and T4(— =) with constant FV.
in the instructions. Instead of “stocks” we label the assets as “stocks of a de-
pletable gold mine”. We do this, as we assume that subjects easily grasp that
a gold mine can be exploited for a ﬁnite time span (e.g. 10 periods), sometimes
gold is found (dividend = 10), while in some periods no gold is found (dividend
= 0). Speciﬁcally, we replace the paragraph in the instructions that explains
the FV-process (see Appendix D, fourth paragraph, starting with “At the end
of each period...”) by the following paragraph:
\The stocks are of a depletable gold mine, in which gold is mined
for 10 periods. In each period the probability of nding (not nd-
ing) gold is 50%. If gold is found in period p, a dividend (prot)
of 10 Taler for each unit of the stock will be paid. If no gold is
found, the dividend will be zero. After 10 periods the gold mine
is depleted and the value of the stock is zero."
What might seem like a small change, provides subjects with a diﬀerent con-
text: instead of trading an abstract stock, calling to their minds stock prices
following a random walk or trending upwards, they have an easy-to-grasp ex-
ample of a depletable asset where declining prices supposedly become easier to
imagine.
The results, presented in the right panel of Figure 3, show markedly smaller
deviations of prices from FVs, compared to T1(+), which is shown in the
left panel. RAD (0.16) and RD (-0.07) in T5(+G) are signiﬁcantly smaller
than the respective values in T1(+), demonstrating that the minor change
in the instructions is suﬃcient to signiﬁcantly reduce mispricing and overval-
uation (Mann-Whitney-U-Test, p-values of 0.025 and 0.004 for RAD and RD,
respectively). Further evidence that subjects’ confusion about the declining FV
is reduced in T5(+G) compared to T1(+) is given in the bottom right panel
of Figure 3. In particular, 55 percent of subjects answered the questionnaire
correctly, compared to 28 percent in T1(+) (bottom left panel).19
19The deviations from the correct forecast of the FV are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between
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Figure 3: Fundamental value (FV, bold line), average treatment prices (bold
line with circles) and volume-weighted mean prices for individual markets (grey
lines) as a function of period (top panels). Errors in forecasting the FV in the
questionnaire (bottom panels). Left panels: treatment T1(+). Right panels:
treatment T5(+G).
3.3.3 Robustness Check: Rekindling Bubbles in the Control Treat-
ment with Context “Gold Mine”
Treatment T6(+G re) serves as a robustness check for Treatment T5(+G).
We increase both the C/A-ratio and the variance of the dividend process of
T5(+G), as these changes in the parameters rekindled bubbles even among
twice-experienced subjects in Hussam, Porter & Smith (2008).20 In particular,
the six markets of Treatment T6(+G re) consist of two rounds of ten peri-
ods each. The ﬁrst round is an exact replication of Treatment T5(+G) with
inexperienced subjects. In the second round these once-experienced subjects
face a very diﬀerent setting. They are randomly shuﬄed into new cohorts of
ten traders each, the number of stocks in the market is reduced by 50%, the
amount of cash is doubled and the variance of the dividend process is multiplied
by a factor of 2.44. In particular, the dividend in each period is drawn from the
realizations 0, 1, and 17 with equal probabilities, which increases the expected
dividend from 5 to 6 and the variance from 25 to almost 61. Consequently, the
FV declines from 60 to zero towards the end of round 2.
20We thank one referee for pointing us to this idea. We set up this robustness check in an
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Figure 4: Fundamental value (FV, bold line), average treatment prices (bold
line with circles) and volume-weighted mean prices for individual markets (grey
lines) as a function of period (top panels) of the robustness check T6(+G re)
(top panels). Errors in forecasting the FV in the questionnaire of T6(+G re)
(bottom panels). The left plots present results for the ﬁrst round (R1), the right
ones those for the second round (R2).
The results of RAD and RD of both rounds (the respective individual and
mean market prices are displayed in the upper panels of Figure 4), are perfectly
in line with Treatment T5(+G) and do not exhibit increased mispricing or
overvaluation in round 2. The respective values of RAD (R1: 0.20; R2: 0.16)
and RD (R1: 0.07; R2: –0.06) are again signiﬁcantly smaller than the respective
values in T1(+) and are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the respective values in
T5(+G).21 In fact, RAD and RD are even slightly lower in R2 than in R1 of
Treatment T6(+G re), though not signiﬁcantly.
Additional and more direct evidence that subjects’ confusion about the de-
clining FV in T6(+G re) remains low compared to T1(+) even in the “rekin-
dle” setting of R2 is given in the lower panels of Figure 4. One can see that in
both rounds 65 to 70 percent of subjects answered the questionnaire correctly.22
21T6(+G re) vs. T1(+), Mann-Whitney-U-Test, p-values of 0.037 (R1), 0.007 (R2) and
0.078 (R1), 0.004 (R2) for RAD and RD, respectively. T6(+G re) vs. T5(+G), Mann-
Whitney-U-Test, P-values of 0.522 (R1), 0.631 (R2) and 0.150 (R1), 0.631 (R2) for RAD and
RD, respectively.
22The percentage deviations from the correct forecast of the FV are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
between T1(+) and T6(+G re) (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p-values of 0.000 and 0.004 for
R1 and R2, respectively) and insigniﬁcant between T5(+G) and round 1 of T6(+G re)
15Following Hussam, Porter & Smith (2008), our markets with only once-
experienced subjects should be even more prone to rekindled bubbles, but as
the data shows, they are not, as the diﬀerent context “gold mine” clearly reduces
confusion about the FV-process.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we explored reasons for the frequent emergence of “bubbles” in
experiments replicating the market design ﬁrst presented in Smith, Suchanek &
Williams (1988). We observed (i) high mispricing in treatments with declining
fundamental value, and (ii) overvaluation when the declining FV is coupled with
an increasing C/A-ratio. By running a questionnaire after the experiments we
found that (iii) subjects are confused by the concept of a declining fundamental
value, since most believed that the FV would stay constant or increase. Finally,
(iv) results from two control treatments with the diﬀerent context “stocks of a
depletable gold mine” showed signiﬁcantly smaller mispricing and overvaluation
than the comparable treatment with the term “stock”. This ﬁnding is robust
to treatment changes like increasing the initial C/A-ratio and the variance of
the dividend process that had previously led to rekindling of bubbles even with
experienced subjects.
Previous studies invariably report that only experience in the same setting
(Dufwenberg, Lindqvist & Moore (2005)) and a very careful explanation and
demonstration of the FV-process (Lei & Vesely (2009)) were able to eliminate
bubbles in SSW-type markets. We have shown that a diﬀerent context can
achieve the same. In our view all three ways to abate bubbles have the same
underlying origin: they all help to reduce or eliminate “confusion” about the
FV-process among subjects that otherwise leads to bubbles. Following and
adapting the argumentation of Chou et al. (2009), Oechssler (2010), and Smith
(2010), the likely reason for the confusion is that a declining FV-process is not
in line with subjects’ past experiences and personal knowledge of real stock
markets. We provide twofold evidence for this claim: (i) In the questionnaire
conducted after the experiments the majority of subjects in markets with de-
clining FVs expected the FV to stay constant or increase. (ii) We observed
signiﬁcantly smaller mispricing and overvaluation when the tradeable asset was
labelled as “stocks of a depletable gold mine”, since subjects’ confusion about
the underlying fundamental value process was reduced (two thirds answered the
questionnaire correctly).
Putting historical pricing anomalies in context of these ﬁndings, we have to
keep in mind that experimental markets are only a very simpliﬁed model of the
real world. Still, our results can help to gain a better understanding of these
bubbles. Two frequently discussed factors for bubble formation are: excess liq-
uidity23 and the impression that the “world had changed”, that a paradigm
shift, a “new economy”24 had emerged. This impression of a “new world” (in
the case of the South Sea bubble of the 1720ies) or “new economy” (dot-com
bubble, railroad- and electricity-booms of the late 19th century) is a ﬁtting de-
(Mann-Whitney-U-test, p-value of 0.2546).
23See e.g. the discussion in Nouriel Roubini (2006) and Adam S. Posen (2006).
24Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier (2003) talk of “productivity enhancing structural
change”.
16scription for many of the famous historic bubbles. It seems that during such
phases the fundamentally justiﬁed values of the traded assets became more un-
certain and diﬃcult to estimate, as new factors gave the impression to have
“changed the game”. E.g. during the South Sea bubble in the 1720ies, uncer-
tainty about the unexplored Paciﬁc Ocean oﬀered the possibility of enormous
riches. Unfortunately they never materialized. During the dot-com bubble at
the turn of the millennium, prospects of enormous productivity gains due to the
improvements in information technology meant that long-standing methods to
calculate fundamental values seemed no longer appropriate, and investors were
ready to provide billions of dollars to companies which had never produced any
operating proﬁt (many of them never did). While some sophisticated investors
may have understood that the actual change to the economy might not be that
large, the mass of less sophisticated investors believed in a “new economy” and
drove prices up, especially when they had ample liquidity. Uncertainty or con-
fusion about the fundamentally justiﬁed value combined with enough liquidity
in the hands of investors seem to have been important drivers behind many
famous historic bubbles.
Translated to our markets, confusion present in a market with declining
fundamental value can lead to large mispricing (T1(+) and T3( =)), unless
abated by a reduced level of confusion about the FV (T5(+G) and T6(+G re)).
When combined with ample liquidity (T1(+)) this leads to overvaluation as
well. When the FV is easier to estimate (e.g. when it is ﬂat in T2(—+) and
T4(— =)) or more intuitively graspable in T5(+G) and T6(+G re), confu-
sion is reduced, mispricing is small, and overvaluation usually nonexistent.
Concluding, our results demonstrate that (i) reducing liquidity in times of
confusion suﬃced to prevent strong overvaluation, but not mispricing, i.e. huge
deviations from the fundamental value. (ii) Reducing confusion – in our case by
an intuitive explanation of the FV-process – suﬃces to reduce mispricing and
overvaluation, even when liquidity is high.
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19Appendix
Appendix A: Individual market results including alterna-
tive measures
Table A1: Bubble measures and formulae for calculation
Measure Formulae




   Pp   FVp
   =jFV j
Relative deviation RD = 1
N
∑N
p=1 (Pp   FVp)=jFV j
Share turnovera ST =
∑N
p=1 V OLp=TSO
Price amplitudeb PA = max(Pp   FVp)=FV1   min(Pp   FVp)=FV1
Total dispersion c TD =
∑N
p=1 jMedianPp   FVpj




Notes: Pp = volume-weighted mean price of period p; FVp = fundamental value of
period p; FV = mean fundamental value in the market; MedianPp = the median
price in period p; N = total number of periods.
a Van Boening, Williams & LaMaster (1993).
b Hussam, Porter & Smith (2008), Lei & Vesely (2009), Noussair, Robin & Ruﬃeux
(2001), David P. Porter & Vernon L. Smith (1995). Varying computation in Haruvy
& Noussair (2006), Haruvy, Lahav & Noussair (2007), and Van Boening, Williams
& LaMaster (1993).
c Haruvy & Noussair (2006), Haruvy, Lahav & Noussair (2007).
20Table A2: Individual market results for RAD, RD, and alternative measures.
Treatment Market RAD RD ST PA TD AB
T1(+) 1 0:223 0:103 1:498 0:410 54:00 2:90
2 0:356 0:168 2:940 0:684 103:25 4:33
3 0:467 0:467 1:843 0:431 130:21 13:02
4 0:262 0:179 1:628 0:452 74:60 5:23
5 0:426 0:112 2:115 0:906 139:25 2:36
6a 0:750 0:750 2:340 0:737 206:67 20:67
Mean 0:414 0:296 2:060 0:603 118:00 8:08
T2(—+) 1 0:004  0:001 2:790 0:029 1:44  0:06
2 0:007 0:007 1:425 0:014 6:39 0:64
3 0:041  0:041 2:528 0:106 10:90  1:09
4a 0:362  0:355 1:925 0:673 187:00  18:10
5 0:025 0:025 3:415 0:027 11:90 1:19
6 0:035 0:005 1:825 0:190 11:46 0:72
Mean 0:079  0:060 2:318 0:173 38:18  2:78
T3( =) 1a 0:501  0:501 2:275 0:512 181:76  14:18
2 0:190  0:180 0:993 0:325 58:00  5:80
3 0:113 0:002 2:843 0:267 30:76 1:37
4 0:279  0:247 0:808 0:441 78:30  5:63
5 0:427 0:427 0:848 0:408 122:50 12:25
6 0:323 0:258 0:845 0:542 86:80 6:88
Mean 0:305  0:040 1:435 0:416 93:02  0:85
T4(— =) 1 0:003  0:003 3:518 0:008 0:60  0:06
2 0:009  0:009 1:620 0:029 4:49  0:45
3 0:008  0:008 1:118 0:035 2:53  0:25
4 0:002 0:002 1:113 0:006 1:30 0:13
5a 0:086  0:086 1:880 0:069 43:14  4:31
6 0:056  0:056 3:315 0:084 25:50  1:45
Mean 0:027  0:027 2:094 0:039 12:93  1:07
T5(+G) 1 0:232 0:061 1:768 0:429 69:45 2:01
2 0:125 0:014 1:388 0:205 35:79 0:52
3 0:082  0:076 4:265 0:093 13:81  1:38
4 0:003 0:000 1:410 0:012 0:15  0:01
5 0:105  0:021 1:605 0:256 28:80  0:60
6 0:394  0:394 2:733 0:229 113:09  11:31
Mean 0:157  0:069 2:195 0:204 43:51  1:80
T6(+G re), R1 1 0:166 0:058 2:640 0:362 43:95 2:20
2 0:260  0:101 2:128 0:568 73:55  2:65
3 0:085 0:068 2:255 0:191 25:27 1:84
4 0:045  0:013 2:543 0:111 7:98  0:50
5 0:346 0:170 1:670 0:679 81:65 5:89
6 0:315 0:217 1:408 0:520 86:30 5:63
Mean 0:203 0:066 2:107 0:405 53:12 2:07
T6(+G re), R2 1 0:115  0:115 1:690 0:079 42:16  4:22
2 0:241  0:039 2:390 0:548 78:00  2:20
3 0:214  0:214 1:640 0:125 68:76  6:88
4 0:071 0:034 3:485 0:173 20:57 1:65
5 0:175 0:014 1:565 0:387 57:61 1:02
6 0:162  0:066 1:510 0:335 59:20  1:92
Mean 0:163  0:064 2:047 0:275 54:38  2:09
a Market dropped in robustness check, see Appendix B.
21Appendix B: Robustness check
Table A3: Robustness checks for research questions 1 and 2. Markets with the
highest RAD in each treatment are dropped from the sample. The values rep-
resent the diﬀerences in means (∆ mean) of the treatments under investigation
and Z-values from a Mann-Whitney-U-Test (Z).
RQ1 (C/A-ratio) RAD RD
T1(+) & T2(—+) vs T3( =) & T4(— =) ∆ mean 0:043 0:084
N=20 Z  0:605  1:890
T1(+) vs T3( =) ∆ mean 0:080 0:154
N=10 Z  0:940  0:940
T2(—+) vs T4(— =) ∆ mean 0:006 0:014
N=10 Z  0:731  1:567
RQ2 (FV) RAD RD
T1(+) & T3( =) vs T2(—+) & T4(— =) ∆ mean 0:288 0:137
N=20 Z  3:780  1:965
T1(+) vs T2(—+) ∆ mean 0:324 0:207
N=10 Z  2:611  2:611
T3( =) vs T4(— =) ∆ mean 0:251 0:067
N=10 Z  2:611  0:313
Notes: * and ** represent the 5 percent and 1 percent signiﬁcance levels.
22Appendix C: Treatment Details
Table A4: Details of the treatments with declining FVs. “Div” is the expected
dividend payment, “FV” denotes fundamental value, “Asset Value” is the num-
ber of stocks multiplied with the expected fundamental value (FV), and “C/A”
stands for the C/A-ratio.
Treatments with declining FVs
T1(+), T5(+G), and T6(+G re), R1
Period No. assets Div FV Asset Value Cash C/A
1 400 5 50 20000 20000 1.0
2 400 5 45 18000 22000 1.2
3 400 5 40 16000 24000 1.5
4 400 5 35 14000 26000 1.9
5 400 5 30 12000 28000 2.3
6 400 5 25 10000 30000 3.0
7 400 5 20 8000 32000 4.0
8 400 5 15 6000 34000 5.7
9 400 5 10 4000 36000 9.0
10 400 5 5 2000 38000 19.0
T3( =)
Period No. assets Div FV Asset Value Cash C/A
1 400 5 50 20000 20000 1.0
2 400 5 45 18000 18000 1.0
3 400 5 40 16000 16000 1.0
4 400 5 35 14000 14000 1.0
5 400 5 30 12000 12000 1.0
6 400 5 25 10000 10000 1.0
7 400 5 20 8000 8000 1.0
8 400 5 15 6000 6000 1.0
9 400 5 10 4000 4000 1.0
10 400 5 5 2000 2000 1.0
T6(+G re), R2
Period No. assets Div FV Asset Value Cash C/A
1 200 6 60 12000 40000 3.33
2 200 6 54 10800 41200 3.81
3 200 6 48 9600 42400 4.42
4 200 6 42 8400 43600 5.19
5 200 6 36 7200 44800 6.22
6 200 6 30 6000 46000 7.67
7 200 6 24 4800 47200 9.83
8 200 6 18 3600 48400 13.44
9 200 6 12 2400 49600 20.67
10 200 6 6 1200 50800 42.33
23Table A5: Details of the treatments with constant FVs. “Div” is the expected
dividend payment, “FV” denotes fundamental value, “Asset Value” is the num-
ber of stocks multiplied with the expected fundamental value (FV), and “C/A”
stands for the C/A-ratio.
Treatments with constant FVs
T2(—+)
Period No. assets Div FV Asset Value Cash C/A
1 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
2 400 0 50 20000 24444 1.2
3 400 0 50 20000 30000 1.5
4 400 0 50 20000 37143 1.9
5 400 0 50 20000 46667 2.3
6 400 0 50 20000 60000 3.0
7 400 0 50 20000 80000 4.0
8 400 0 50 20000 113333 5.7
9 400 0 50 20000 180000 9.0
10 400 0 50 20000 380000 19.0
T4(— =)
Period No. assets Div FV Asset Value Cash C/A
1 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
2 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
3 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
4 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
5 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
6 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
7 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
8 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
9 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
10 400 0 50 20000 20000 1.0
24Appendix D: Experimental instructions for treatments fea-
turing a declining FV25
Dear Participant! We welcome you to this experimental session and kindly ask
you to refrain from talking to each other for the duration of the experiment. If
you face any diﬃculties, contact one of the supervisors.
General Information
This experiment is concerned with replicating an asset market where traders
can trade the stocks of a ﬁctitious company (stocks of a depletable gold mine)
for 10 consecutive periods.
Market Description
The market consists of ten subjects. Five of the ten traders get an initial
endowment of 20 assets and a working capital of 3000 Taler, another ﬁve are
endowed with 60 assets and 1000 Taler at the outset. At the beginning of the
experiment the asset has a fundamental value (FV) of 50. Evaluating the asset at
its initial FV yields that each subjects’ wealth adds up to 4000 Taler. In every
period you can sell and/or buy assets, and your asset and Taler inventories
are transferred to the next trading period, respectively. Each trading period
automatically terminates after two minutes.
Trade is accomplished in form of a double auction, i.e., each trader can appear
as buyer and seller at the same time. You can submit any quote of assets with
prices ranging from 0 to a maximum of 999 Taler (with at most two decimal
places). For every bid you make, you have to enter the number of assets you
intend to trade as well. Note that your Taler and asset inventory cannot drop
below zero.
At the end of each trading period, every asset pays a dividend (proﬁt) which gets
summed up to your Taler holding. The dividend (for one asset) amounts either 0
or 10 Taler, given equal probability. Thus, an asset’s average dividend amounts
5 Taler for every period. Assets feature a life-span of 10 trading periods, i.e.,
after dividends are paid out at the end of period 10, assets are worthless. (The
stocks are for a depletable gold mine, in which gold is mined for 10 periods. In
each period the probability of nding (not nding) gold is 50%. If gold is found
in period p a dividend (prot) of 10 Taler for each unit of the stock will be paid.
If no gold is found, the dividend will be zero. After 10 periods the gold mine is
depleted and the fundamental value of the stocks is zero.)
You do not get any information about the dividend realization of the current
period, i.e. you do not know the dividend payment for the current or the coming
periods. The only thing you know is that the dividend either takes the value of
10 or 0 (per asset) in each period. At the end of a period you will be informed
about the dividend realization of the expired period.
Fundamental Value (FV)
The subsequent table might help you to make your decisions. The ﬁrst column,
labeled “Ending Period”, indicates the last trading period of the market. The
second column, labeled “Current Period”, indicates the period during which the
25To mimic closely already existing SSW markets, we use almost identical instructions as
Dufwenberg, Lindqvist & Moore (2005). Instructions and sceenshots are for T1(+), text
changes in T3( =) are in (bold), text changes in T5(+G) and in T6(+G re), R1 are in
(italic).
25FV is being calculated. The third column gives the number of holding periods
from the period in the second column until the end of the market. The fourth
column, labeled “Average Dividend Value Per Period”, gives the average amount
that the dividend will be in each period for each unit held in your inventory.
The ﬁfth column, labeled “Fundamental Value Per Unit of Inventory”, gives the
expected total dividend earnings (per asset) for the remainder of the experiment.
That is, for each unit you hold in your inventory for the remainder of the market,
you receive in expectation the amount listed in column 5, which is deﬁned as the
FV of the current period. The number in column 5 is calculated by multiplying
the numbers in column 3 and 4.
Suppose for example that there are 4 periods remaining in a market. Since the
dividend on a unit of asset has a 50% chance of being 0 and a 50% chance of
being 10, the dividend is in expectation 5 Taler (per period for each asset). If
you hold one asset for 4 periods, the total dividend paid on the unit over 4
periods is in expectation 4 * 5 = 20.
Ending Current Number of x Average Dividend = Fundamental Value
period period Holding Periods Value per Period per Unit of Inventory
10 1 10 5 50
10 2 9 5 45
10 3 8 5 40
10 4 7 5 35
10 5 6 5 30
10 6 5 5 25
10 7 4 5 20
10 8 3 5 15
10 9 2 5 10
10 10 1 5 5
(Saving account
In addition to your Taler account you possess a saving account. Your
dividend earnings during the course of the experiment are directly
transferred to this account. In each period an amount of 200 Taler
are added to the account to increase your savings. This procedure
may result in a negative Taler account. As long as your Taler holding
are below zero you are not allowed to post bids or to buy shares. At
the end of the experiment your savings are added to your TOTAL
EARNINGS.)
Asset trading
If you buy assets, your Taler holding is diminished by the respective expenditures
(price * volume). Inversely, if you sell assets, your Taler holding will be increased
by the respective revenues (price * volume).
Calculate Your Earnings
At the end of the market (after 10 periods), assets have a value of zero. Solely
your Taler holdings (and your balance on the saving account (dividend
payments and savings)) serve for the determination of your total earnings.
Your TOTAL EARNINGS at the end of the experiment =
26Taler holdings (+ balance on the saving account).
Your total earnings in this experiment are converted into Euro at a rate of
400 Taler = 1 Euro
Important information
 No interest is payed for Taler holdings.
 (Savings of 200 Taler each period.)
 Each trading period lasts for 120 seconds.
 The experiment ends after 10 periods.
 Use the full stop (.) as decimal place.
Trading screen: By means of the following ﬁgure, the procedure of trading
(buying and selling) will be illustrated.
Information about 
current Stock and 
Money.
Summary of Own Sales and Purchases 
in the running Period (including cor-
responding Quantities and Prices).
BID: you have to enter 
Quantity and Price. Trade 
does not take place until 
another participant accepts 
your offer!!!
ASK: analogue to 
Purchase BID - see above.
List of all BIDS: from all 
traders - your own Bids are 
written in blue. The offer with 
blue background is always 
the best, i.e., it yields the 
highest revenues for the 
seller.
List of all ASKS: from all 
traders - your own Asks are 
written in blue. The offer with 
blue background is always 
the best, i.e., it is the chea-
pest one for the buyer.
SELL: You sell the ente-
red Quantity, given the 
Price with the blue back-
ground. If you enter a 
higher amount than offe-
red in the blue box, you 
sell the offered Quantity at 
most.
BUY: You buy the ente-
red Quantity, given the 
Price with the blue back-
ground. If you enter a 
higher amount than offe-
red in the blue box, you 






27History screen: appears after each trading period (for 10 seconds), providing
you with information of past periods:
Price-Chart, 
displaying avera-
ge prices of pre-
vious periods.
Stock Closing 
Price (in the 
respective period).
Actual Dividend 
realization (for one 
asset) in the respec-
tive period.
Total Dividend Earnings for 
the respective period 
(Stock × Dividend).
28Appendix E: Experimental instructions for treatments fea-
turing a constant FV26
Dear Participant! We welcome you to this experimental session and kindly ask
you to refrain from talking to each other for the duration of the experiment. If
you face any diﬃculties, contact one of the supervisors.
General Information
This experiment is concerned with replicating an asset market where traders
can trade the stocks of a ﬁctitious company for 10 consecutive periods.
Market Description
The market consists of ten subjects. Five of the ten traders get an initial endow-
ment of 20 assets and a working capital of 3000 Taler, another ﬁve are endowed
with 60 assets and 1000 Taler at the outset. At the beginning of the experiment
the asset has a fundamental value (FV) of 50. Evaluating the asset at its initial
FV yields that each subjects’ wealth adds up to 4000 Taler. In every period you
can sell and/or buy assets, and your asset and Taler inventories are transferred
to the next trading period, respectively. Each trading period automatically ter-
minates after two minutes.
Trade is accomplished in form of a double auction, i.e., each trader can appear
as buyer and seller at the same time. You can submit any quote of assets with
prices ranging from 0 to a maximum of 999 Taler (with at most two decimal
places). For every bid you make, you have to enter the number of assets you
intend to trade as well. Note that your Taler and asset inventory cannot drop
below zero.
At the end of each trading period, every asset pays a dividend (proﬁt) of 5 Taler
or causes holding costs of -5 Taler with equal probability. Thus, an asset’s av-
erage payout amounts 0 Taler at the end of each period. Dividends and holding
costs are collected in a separate account. Assets feature a life-span of 10 trading
periods. At the end of period 10 assets are bought back by the experimenter at
a price of 50.
For the current period you do not get any information wether a dividend will
be paid out or holding cost will accrue. The only thing you know is that the
dividend payment and the holding cost either takes the value of +5 or –5 (per
asset) in each period. At the end of a period you will be informed wether a
dividend is paid out or holding costs accrued for the expired period.
Fundamental Value (FV)
The subsequent table might help you to make your decisions. The ﬁrst column,
labeled “Current Period”, indicates the period during which the FV is being cal-
culated. The second column, labeled “Average Payment Per Period”, gives the
average amount that the dividend/holding cost will be in each period for each
unit held in your inventory. The third column, labeled “Fundamental Value Per
Unit of Inventory”, gives the average value for each unit held in your inventory
from now until the end of the experiment. That is, for each unit you hold in
your inventory for the remainder of the experiment, you will earn on average
the amount listed in column 3.
26To mimic closely already existing SSW markets, we use almost identical instructions as
Noussair, Robin & Ruﬃeux (2001). Instructions are for T4(— =), text changes in T2(—+)
are in (bold).
29Current Average Payment Fundamental Value
period per Period per Unit of Inventory












Your dividend earnings (positive) and holding costs (negative) during the course
of the experiment are directly transferred to a saving account. At the end of
the experiment your cumulated earnings/losses are added to/substracted from
your TOTAL EARNINGS.
Asset trading
If you buy assets, your Taler holding is diminished by the respective expendi-
tures (price * volume). Inversely, if you sell assets, your Taler holding will be
increased by the respective revenues (price * volume).
Calculate Your Earnings
At the end of each period earnings of external investments are added
to your Taler holdings.
End of period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Earnings 444 556 714 953 1333 2000 3333 6667 20000 0
Your total earnings at the end of the market (after 10 periods) are your Taler
holdings plus your balance on the saving account (dividend payments minus
holding costs) plus the value of your asset holdings (number of assets * 50).
Your TOTAL EARNINGS at the end of the experiment =
Taler holdings + balance on the saving account + (# of assets * 50).
Your total earnings in this experiment are converted into Euro at a rate of
400 (4000) Taler = 1 Euro
Important information
 No interest is payed for Taler holdings.
 Each trading period lasts for 120 seconds.
 The experiment ends after 10 periods.
30 Use the full stop (.) as decimal place.
Trading and history screen are identical to treatments with
declining FV and therefore omitted.
31Appendix F: Experimental instructions for round 2 of Treat-
ment T6(+G re)
Market Description
The market consists of ten subjects, which are randomly reassigned to the mar-
ket. Five of the ten traders get an initial endowment of 10 assets and a working
capital of 4600 Taler, another ﬁve are endowed with 30 assets and 3400 Taler
at the outset. At the beginning of the experiment the asset has a fundamental
value (FV) of 60. Evaluating the asset at its initial FV yields that each subjects’
wealth adds up to 5200 Taler.
The stocks are for a depletable gold mine, in which gold is mined for 10 periods.
In each period there is an equal probability of ﬁnding plenty of gold, little gold
or no gold. If plenty of gold is found in period p a dividend (proﬁt) of 17 Taler
for each unit of the stock is paid. If little gold is found, the dividend is 1. If no
gold is found, the dividend is zero. After 10 periods the gold mine is depleted
and the fundamental value of the stocks is zero.
Fundamental Value
Since the dividend on a unit of asset has a 33.33% chance of being 17, 1 or 0, the
dividend is on average 6 Taler (per period for each asset). If you hold one asset
for 4 periods, the total dividend paid on the unit over 4 periods is on average 4
* 6 = 24.
Ending Current Number of x Average Dividend = Fundamental Value
period period Holding Periods Value per Period per Unit of Inventory
10 1 10 6 60
10 2 9 6 54
10 3 8 6 48
10 4 7 6 42
10 5 6 6 36
10 6 5 6 30
10 7 4 6 24
10 8 3 6 18
10 9 2 6 12
10 10 1 6 6
Calculate Your Earnings
At the end of the market (after 10 periods), assets have a value of zero. Solely
your Taler holdings serve the determination of your total earnings.
Your TOTAL EARNINGS in this experiment are converted into Euro at a rate
of
520 Taler = 1 Euro
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of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988), we vary the fundamental value process
(constant or declining) and the cash-to-asset value-ratio (constant or increasing).
We observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value, while
overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing C/A-ratio. A questionnaire
reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects, as they ex-
pect the fundamental value to stay constant. Running the experiment with a dierent
context (\stocks of a depletable gold mine" instead of \stocks") signicantly reduces
mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion.
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